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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 10-1913
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
WILLIAM L. LUCAS,
also known as BILLY,
William L. Lucas,
Appellant
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Crim. No. 1-99-cr-00030-003)
District Judge: Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr.
_____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1
May 12, 2011
Before: SMITH, CHAGARES and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: August 3, 2011)
_____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_____________
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.
William L. Lucas (“Lucas”) admitted to violating the terms of his supervised
release and was sentenced to twenty-four months‟ imprisonment to be served

consecutively to his existing state sentence. Lucas then appealed. His attorney has
moved to withdraw as counsel pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
For the reasons that follow, we will grant the motion and affirm the Judgment of the
District Court.
I.
As we write only for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and procedural
history of the case, we set forth only those facts necessary to our analysis.
Lucas pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 on January 26, 2000 and was sentenced to ninety-six
months in prison followed by five years of supervised release. Lucas served his term of
imprisonment and was released in July 2007. On August 5, 2008, while on supervised
release, Lucas was arrested by the City of Pittsburgh Police and charged with two counts
each of possession of a controlled substance and possession with intent to deliver. On
December 9, 2009, Lucas entered a negotiated guilty plea in the Court of Common Pleas
for Allegheny County to one count each of possession of a controlled substance and
possession with intent to deliver. He was sentenced to five to ten years‟ imprisonment
followed by ten years‟ probation.
As a result of this conviction, the U.S. Probation Office filed a Petition for
Probation/Supervised Release Action on December 28, 2009, alleging a violation of his
supervised release. In his hearing on March 22, 2010, Lucas admitted to violating the
terms of supervised release by illegally possessing a controlled substance. Based on this
admission, the District Court found that he had violated his supervised release and further
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determined that Lucas‟s advisory guidelines range called for an imprisonment term
between twenty-four and thirty months.
Lucas‟s counsel requested that the District Court impose no penalty or,
alternatively, impose a sentence to run concurrent with his state sentence. The District
Court disagreed with counsel‟s recommendation. It stated that it was bothered by the
similarity between the federal and state convictions and noted that a concurrent sentence
would amount to essentially no punishment for the violation of supervised release.
Accordingly, the District Court imposed a sentence of twenty-four months‟ imprisonment
to be served after the state sentence.
Lucas filed a timely appeal, and appellate counsel was appointed for him. Lucas‟s
attorney has moved to withdraw and submitted an Anders brief.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
Anders sets forth “the general duties of a lawyer representing an indigent criminal
defendant on appeal when the lawyer seeks leave to withdraw from continued
representation on the grounds that there are no nonfrivolous issues to appeal.” United
States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 779 (3d Cir. 2000). We implement Anders through Local
Appellate Rule 109.2, which, in pertinent part, provides:
Where, upon review of the district court record, counsel is
persuaded that the appeal presents no issue of even arguable
merit, counsel may file a motion to withdraw and supporting
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
which must be served upon the appellant and the United
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States. The United States must file a brief in response.
Appellant may also file a brief in response pro se. . . . If the
panel agrees that the appeal is without merit, it will grant
counsel‟s Anders motion, and dispose of the appeal without
appointing new counsel. If the panel finds arguable merit to
the appeal, or that the Anders brief is inadequate to assist the
court in its review, it will appoint substitute counsel, order
supplemental briefing and restore the case to the calendar.
3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a). To meet the requirements of Local Appellate Rule 109.2,
counsel must “satisfy the court that he or she has thoroughly scoured the record in search
of appealable issues,” and “explain why the issues are frivolous.” Marvin, 211 F.3d at
780. However, “[c]ounsel need not raise and reject every possible claim.” United States
v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001). “[A]t a minimum, he or she must meet the
„conscientious examination‟ standard set forth in Anders.” Id. This Court, in turn, asks
“whether counsel adequately fulfilled” the requirements of Rule 109.2, and “whether an
independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.” Id.
When an Anders brief is adequate, we limit our review to the portion of the record
that is highlighted in the brief. Id. at 301. When the Anders brief is not adequate, we
may undertake a more expansive review of the record. See id. (consulting portions of the
record identified by the pro se brief where Anders brief was inadequate). Regardless of
the adequacy of the Anders brief, we will grant counsel‟s motion to withdraw without
appointing new counsel if we determine that the appeal is patently frivolous. See United
States v. Coleman, 575 F.3d 316, 321-22 (3d Cir. 2009).
A.
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In his Anders brief, counsel raises only the issue of whether the District Court
imposed an unlawful sentence. In this case, counsel has fulfilled his obligation set forth
in Anders by explaining that the District Court‟s sentence was procedurally and
substantively reasonable, and that no nonfrivolous appealable issues remain. Lucas has
not submitted a brief on his own behalf. As a result, pursuant to Youla, we will limit our
review to the portion of the record addressed in counsel‟s Anders brief.
In a sentencing appeal, we “review the sentence under an abuse-of-discretion
standard” to ensure
that the district court committed no significant procedural
error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating)
the guidelines range, treating the guidelines as mandatory,
failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, selecting a
sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to
adequately explain the chosen sentence – including an
explanation for any deviation from the guidelines range.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
The District Court committed no procedural errors in this case. The record
indicates the District Court properly calculated Lucas‟s advisory guidelines range as
twenty-four to thirty months‟ imprisonment, to be served consecutively with his state
sentence. The District Court also acknowledged the advisory nature of the guidelines,
measured all arguments presented by the parties, considered the relevant factors set forth
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and thoroughly explained why it chose Lucas‟s sentence.
Having found no procedural errors, we turn to whether or not the sentence
imposed by the District Court was substantively reasonable. “[T]he appellate court
should consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse5

of-discretion standard” taking into account “the totality of the circumstances, including
the extent of any variance from the guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. “If the
district court's sentence is procedurally sound, we will affirm it unless no reasonable
sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for
the reasons the district court provided.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d
Cir. 2009) (en banc). In the present matter, the District Court carefully considered the
circumstances of Lucas‟s case and arrived at a sentence at the low end of the guidelines
range. This was a reasonable sentence.
III.
In sum, we conclude that Lucas‟s appeal does not present any nonfrivolous issues,
as the District Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Lucas‟s sentence.
Accordingly, we will grant counsel‟s motion to withdraw and affirm the Judgment of the
District Court.
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